In 2010 Spirit airlines announced that it would start charging passengers for carry-on baggage. Using a generalized diff-in-diff estimation, we examine the impact of Spirit's policy change on its rivals' prices. Our results show that Spirit's rivals reduce their prices by about 5% after Spirit's baggage fee policy. Looking further on the price distribution, we find that the policy impact is larger for prices at the 50-percentile, relative to prices at the 80-percentile and 20-percentile. Next, we take into account the outsourcing status of Spirit's rivals, i.e., whether they operate their own flights or outsource to regional airlines. Our results show that in response to Spirit's carry-on baggage fee policy, relative to carriers which do not outsource, carriers who outsource reduce their ticket prices significantly more. Due to the common nature of the outsourcing contracts between major and regional carriers, our results suggest that major carriers, facing Spirit's policy change, shift much of the burden of price reduction to the regional carriers they contract with.
Introduction
The U.S. airline industry has experienced a significant increase in unbundling where charging allinclusive ticket prices are replaced by a business model of lower basic prices plus additional fees for add-ons. 1 For example, most major airlines started charging for checked bags in 2008, and in 2017 several of them started selling Basic Economy fares for which travelers cannot have a free carry-on luggage, or pick a seat and so on. Our paper investigates the impacts of a specific unbundling strategy, namely Spirit's decision to charge for carry-on luggage.
Spirit Airlines (Spirit) was the first carrier to charge carry-on luggage fee in 2010. Other UltraLow-Cost carriers like Frontier and Allegiant followed Spirit's step in 2012 and 2014 respectively. More recently, legacy carriers such as American and United also began to charge carry-on luggage fee to basic economy class passengers on most of their routes in 2017. Charging for carry-on baggage has important implications on the welfare of travelers, and it also sheds light on policy making when decision makers evaluate market competition. 2 However, the impact of carry-on luggage fee has not been examined empirically and this paper is the first one to do so. In this paper, we investigate the impact of Spirit's carry-on luggage fee and ask the following questions: (1) What are the effects of carry-on luggage fee on competing carriers' ticket prices? (2) Do carriers' response vary depending on their outsourcing status?
Using a generalized difference-in-difference method, we find that on average Spirit's carry-on luggage fee decreases its rivals' average ticket prices by about 5% or $9.6. Besides the effect on average ticket prices, we also explore the effect on different points of Spirit's rivals' price distribution. The largest effect should fall in the price level where tickets from Spirit and other carriers are closest substitutes. We find that the effects are all negative and significant on rivals' 20, 50 and 80 price percentiles, and the impact on the median prices is the largest (decrease by 6.6% or $12).
We then investigate whether an airline's response to Spirit's baggage fee policy on any given route, depends on the airline's outsourcing status on that route. Outsourcing happens when a carrier sells the tickets but outsources the flight operations to another carrier (usually one of the regional carriers). Outsourcing has become quite popular in the U.S. airline industry and has garnered much attention among scholars recently. We explore this questions by further dividing both the treated group and control group into outsourcing and non-outsourcing subgroups depending on whether the carrier outsources operations in the market. A generalized triple difference estimation is employed to study whether the outsourcing carriers respond differently to Spirit's policy relative 1 Examples include baggage fees, premium seats etc. Airlines have also found new sources of revenue from new services such as Wi-Fi and Entertainment.
2 For example, in its 2012 earnings statement, 40% of Spirit's revenue comes from ancillary fees which include baggage fees. See "Spirit Air to charge up to $100 for carry-on bags," CNN Money, May 3, 2012. Also, Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2017) reports that the total baggage fee (including checked and carry-on) revenue of U.S airlines reached 4.2 billion dollars in 2016.
to carriers which do not outsource. 3 We find that outsourcing carriers decrease average prices more than non-outsourcing carriers by 5.8%. The impact is particularly strong and significant for median prices -the difference in price reduction is 10.7%. These results imply the transfer of the price burden from outsourcing carriers to regional airline.
Literature Review
Our paper is related to the literature on price unbundling and add-on pricing. There is large theory literature covering both monopoly and duopoly. Studies looking at monopoly are mainly concerned with whether or how the monopolist should charge for the add-on (see, for example, Allon et al. (2011 ), Fruchter et al. (2011 ). 4 On the other hand, in a duopoly setting, Verboven (1999), Ellison (2005) , Gabaix and Laibson (2006) , Dahremöller (2013) , and Shulman and Geng (2013) theoretically analyze how firms price add-on when some or all consumers are not aware of the add-on fees. Other research such as Shugan et al. (2016) and Lin (2017) explains why firms price add-on in some cases instead of others. Geng and Shulman (2015) studies firms performing add-on pricing for cost saving may lead to profit loss. However, these works all assume firms perform price unbundling at the same time, not paying attention to the case when only one firm does.
There is also an extensive literature which explores price unbundling empirically. Nicolae et al. (2016) , Scotti et al. (2016) , and Barone et al. (2012) study the relationship between checked baggage fee and factors other than ticket prices like flights' on time performance, mishandled baggage rate and carriers' stock prices. Brueckner et al. (2015) , Scotti and Dresner (2015) , and Yazdi et al. (2017) provides evidence that checked baggage fee decreases the monopolist's own bare ticket prices.
Our paper is most closely related to a more recent strand of literature which study the impact of checked baggage fee. Brueckner et al. (2015) analyze how an airline's checked baggage fee affects its own prices. They find that when an airline charges for checked baggage fee, their basic ticket prices go down but the all-inclusive prices (i.e., including checked baggage fee) goes up. Zou et al. (2017) and Henrickson and Scott (2012) show that the amount of baggage fee has positive effect on competing carriers which do not charge baggage fee (Southwest and JetBlue) . This is in sharp contrast to our findings where Spirit's carry-on baggage fee leads to a price reduction of its rivals. Our paper differs from these studies in several aspects. First, while they study checked baggage fee, we analyze the impact of carry-on baggage fee. Second, the fact that only Spirit charges for carry-on baggage and that Spirit only operates in some markets allow us to use to a difference-indifference estimation to better identify the impacts of the baggage fee policy. Third, we further avoid the policy endogeneity issue by looking at the impacts of Spirit's baggage fee policy, not on its own prices, but on its rival's prices. And we include all Spirit's rivals whereas in Zou et al. (2017) and Henrickson and Scott (2012) , the rivals are restricted to Southwest and Jetblue since most other rivals also charge for checked baggage. Lastly, we also explore the policy's differential impacts on different points of the price distribution or different types of carriers depending on their outsourcing status.
Our paper is also closely related to outsourcing literature. The seminal work in airline outsourcing literature Januszewski Forbes and Lederman (2009) investigates when carriers use their own regionals and when carriers use independent regionals. Tan (forthcoming) shows that legacy carriers have more outsourcing behaviors on a route with stronger competition, and have lower ticket prices. Shi (2016) studies what factors determine carriers' outsourcing behavior, and provides evidence that carriers with and without outsourcing have different responses to market entry. As carry-on luggage fee is a pricing strategy of advancing market competition, we also investigate whether carriers with outsourcing behavior respond to carry-on luggage fee differently compared with carriers without outsourcing behavior. It is commonly believed that regional carriers have lower cost, and thus carriers that are already involved in outsourcing and set ticket prices may transfer their price burden to the regionals. Studying their different responses to baggage fee can help us better understand if carriers' outsourcing is creating more room to compete in price and competing at the cost of regionals. In this aspect, our paper is the first one to estimate the response of carriers with outsourcing behavior to price unbundling.
Our paper is also related to the literature on competition in the airline industry. Similar to our paper, much of the focus has been on pricing. For example, Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), Brueckner et al. (2013) , Gayle and Wu (2013) and Tan (2016) study incumbents' price response to market entry. Kim and Singal (1993) examine the effect of mergers on prices. Other research, such as Borenstein and Rose (1994) , Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), Dai et al. (2014) and Kim and Shen (2017) , analyze the relationship between competition and price dispersion. Price unbundling gives the firm an extra instrument in competing with its rivals and it would be of interest to see how it affects price dispersion. The downside is that the price data only include the basic fares, before the baggage fees are included.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources and our variable construction. Section 3 shows the estimation method. In Section 4, we present the estimation results and some discussions. We run some robustness check in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6. Details about our data filter and constructed variables can be found in the Appendix.
Data and Variable
The main data set is the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) data, a quarterly survey of 10% domestic airline tickets sold to passengers. The data set includes variables like year, quarter, ticket price, passenger number, origin airport, destination airport and the airline carrier. 5 We focus on the non-stop routes and define a market as a directional nonstop airport-to-airport route. That is, the route from SFO to LAX is a different market from LAX to SFO. The data set is aggregated 6 to quarter-market-carrier level, and each period in our sample is a quarter. An observation in the sample, for example, can be that American Airlines delivers 11675 passengers from LaGuardia Airport to O'Hare Airport in the 3rd quarter of 2010 at the average ticket price of $206.6. Spirit's policy (charging $20 for carry-on luggage) took effect in August 2010. Thus, we restrict ourselves on the periods from quarter 1 of 2009 to quarter 4 of 2011. We choose this time span because it is long enough to check the common trend assumption, but not too long to bring too much complication into our estimation.
To solve the potential endogeneity problem raised by one of the key control variables, market competition level, we use instrumental variable method. We instrument the competition variable because we want to interpret the competition effects in addition to the policy treatment effects that is our main interest. Following the literature, many of our instruments are constructed based upon enplanement. The enplanement is the number of passengers boarded on flights in the market. This number is usually larger than the number of passengers of the market, because it contains passengers from connecting flights. The T-100 Domestic Segment Data reports enplanement directly, but we do not use it as literature does. The reason is as the follows. DB1B data set reports two types of airline carriers: ticketing carrier and operating carrier 7 . We use ticketing carrier to study carriers' pricing behavior in this paper because it is the carrier who sells tickets and sets up ticket prices. On the other hand, the carrier reported by T-100 data is commonly recognized as operating carrier. Although there is no difficulty if we merge DB1B data and T-100 data by operating carrier, they cannot be matched perfectly without dropping observations. So instead of using T-100 data, we approximate enplanement directly from DB1B data itself. 8 Some of other instruments come from the population in the areas around airports. We use yearly population estimations provided by Metropolitan and Micropolitan statistical areas population estimation data.
Appendix shows how we clean the data in detail. After cleaning it, we construct a panel data set with 55814 observations of 12 quarters and 4288 directional non-stop routes/markets. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the sample. We can see that there is a large amount of variations in ticket prices as well as market competition levels (HHI). More than one third of the observations 5 The ticket price is the bare fare price without any luggage fee or other payments. The passenger number indicates how many passengers buy their tickets at the given price.
6 We aggregate the data using carriers' listing prices without any weights instead of using passengers' purchasing prices by the weights of passenger numbers. We think it is more reasonable to use the former as we are estimating carriers' pricing strategy. 7 Ticketing carrier is the carrier who sells flight tickets to passengers and sets up ticket prices, and operating carrier is the one who operates airplanes and directly provides flight services. Very often they may not be the same because a ticketing carrier may outsource the service to another operating carrier or two carriers may have code sharing behavior. 8 Please see details in the Appendix.
involve outsourcing behavior. Table 2 and Table 3 provide the summary statistics of major carriers and Low-Cost carriers separately. On average Low-Cost carriers have lower ticket prices and more passengers per market than major carriers. We also list the carriers and the number of markets in which each carrier operates in every quarter, as shown in Table 4 . Table 5 shows the number of common markets in which each carrier operates together with Spirit. The shaded column 2010q3 is the quarter when Spirit began to charge carry-on luggage fee. We can see that there is no much difference closely around the policy with respect to the market numbers of carriers. This could allow us to use fixed effects because the airlines' response to the policy change is immediate. The sample includes 12 competing carriers in total, 11 out of which compete directly with Spirit. Delta and Southwest are the two carriers which Sprit mainly competes with by the number of common markets. From these two tables we can also tell that Spirit as well as other carriers keeps entering and exiting markets in every period or has seasonal behaviors as the numbers of markets for each carrier vary across time.
Estimation Method
We are interested in exploring the impacts of Spirit airlines' baggage fee policy, in particular, its impact on airfare. Spirit airlines only operates in a few selected routes (markets) and we would expect the policy to have impact in these routes but not in others. This distinction naturally calls for a difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff) method. However, before we proceed with estimation, we first need to check the exogeneity of treatment (policy).
Exogeneity of treatment
Let Spirit markets be the markets which Spirit operates in and let Non-Spirit markets denote the other markets. We can compare Spirit airlines' own prices before and after the policy (treatment). But there is a problem with this approach. Spirit makes baggage fee policy and price decisions simultaneously, so the policy is endogenous to Spirit's own prices. For this reason, we do not analyze the impact of policy on Spirit's own prices. On the other hand, Spirit's baggage fee policy, which applies to all Spirit markets, can be considered exogenous to competing carriers in any given Spirit market, as is commonly assumed in the literature (See, for example, Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) , Prince and Simon (2014, 2017) ) In particular, competing carriers's price decisions in a given market should not affect Spirit's overall decision of the baggage fee policy. Under this assumption, our treated group includes all carriers other than Spirit airlines in Sprit markets. The control group contains all carriers in non-Spirit markets.
Standard diff-in-diff
Often times treatment takes places for a group which is stable over the whole sample (before and after post treatment). In this case, it is common to introduce an interaction term, which is the product of two dummies variables: T reated j and P olicy t . T reated j = 1 if and only if the observation is in the treated group (before or after treatment). P olicy t = 1 if and only if the time period is after treatment. One can then run estimation with this interaction term. Various other variables may be controlled for as well, but the focus usually is the interaction term which captures the diff-in-diff estimate.
This method, however, cannot be directly applied to our setting. This is because the treated group is not stable over our sample period due to Spirit airline's entry/exit decisions. Of course, we can choose to include only markets that are stable over time, by removing all markets where Spirit operates only during part of the sample period. We did not pursue this direction for two reasons. First, for a significant fraction of the markets in which Spirit ever operates in, Spirit operates only during part of the sample periods. Requiring a stable treated group would remove all these markets. Second, this process also leads to removal of selected markets and the resulting policy impacts are based on selected Spirit markets rather than all Spirit markets.
Generalized diff-in-diff
We first define a dummy variable SptM kt jt which takes value 1 if Spirit operates in market j in period t. Otherwise SptM kt jt = 0. Also recall that P olicy t = 1 if period t is at or after the period Spirit started charging carry-on baggage fees. We can then run a regression with SptM kt jt , P olicy t and their interaction term SptM kt jt × P olicy t . Then estimate of the interaction term coefficient gives us the average treatment effect.
While this estimation can be run fine, there is the problem of testing for common trend, a key assumption needed for diff-in-diff estimation to work properly. In particular, we cannot use the standard linear time trend test to test for common trend. Because of carriers' (Spirit and others) entry and exit behavior across markets and over time, there will be missing observations in the treated and control groups, leading to holes in linear time trend test. An alternative is to use Lead variables for the Granger causality test to see whether the common trend assumption holds. The idea is that in a balanced panel data a fake policy that "happens" one period before the real treatment (at time t) should have no impact. But in our unbalanced panel data if carrier i does not operate in market j at period t − 1, then the fake policy (at period t − 1) does not make much sense. Instead of letting the fake policy happens one period before the real treatment, we let it happen one observation before the real treatment for carrier i in market j in either treated or control group. Because of entry/exit decision, the 1-observation lead varies across carrier-routes. If we use 1-period lead instead of 1-observation lead, then it is possible that 2-period lead is defined but not 1-period lead for a carrier-route, which does not make much sense. Similarly, we define k-observation leads rather than k-period leads, k = 2, 3, 4. 9
Econometric model for generalized diff-in-diff
Having defined the key variables, we consider the following econometric model
where λ ij and θ t capture carrier-route and time fixed effects, and X ijt include route level and carrier-route level controls such as HHI, M erger dummies etc. Because we control for time fixed effects, the stand-alone P olicy t is absorbed so only its interaction term shows up in the right hand side of the equation.
The T tests of the interaction terms of leads are Granger-causality tests, and served to check whether the key assumption of difference-in-difference method, the common trend assumption holds.
Estimation results

Effect on Average Prices
Before we run regressions using the econometric model in (1), we first present some simple evidence to illustrate the policy impact. Figure 1 plots the prices at two markets in our sample: a Spirit market (from Detroit to Orlando) and a Non-Spirit market (from Buffalo to Orlando). The vertical line illustrates when Spirit starts charging carry-on baggage fee. 10 From the figure, we can see that the two markets generally follow common trend pre-treatment. However, immediately after the policy change, the two markets diverge: the non-Spirit market sees a price increase while the Spirit market experiences a significant price drop.
This figure provides a preliminary evidence that Spirit's carry-on luggage fee policy has a negative impact on its rivals' ticket prices. Next, we rely on more rigorous econometric methods to combine all markets and also control for covariates. The results are presented in Table 6 , where the dependent variable is log of average fares at each carrier-route-quarter combination. Column (1) explores the baseline model where we control for time fixed effects and carrier-market fixed effects in all specifications. We can see that after Spirit's baggage fee policy, its rivals lower their prices by about 4.2% on average. The coefficient of HHI is positive and significant, consistent with the usual notion that prices are higher when markets become more concentrated. In Column (2), we also use robust standard errors and cluster them at the route (market) level. The t-stats change slightly but the estimate of the policy impact remains negative and significant. Column (3) control for the 3 mergers involving major airlines during our sample periods: DeltaNorthwest, Southwest-AirTran and United-Continental. Figure 2 provides the timeline of these mergers. One concern is that our estimation may be biased by mergers. 11 To disentangle the impact of Spirit's baggage policy from the potential merger effects, we include a set of merger dummy variables for each of the 3 mergers. 12 Using merger dummies also introduces a complication. Because merging carriers make merger and pricing decisions simultaneously, mergers must be endogenous to merging carriers' ticket prices. To avoid this endogeneity problem, we drop observations of merging carriers in merger process (i.e., merger has started but not finished). We believe, however, that mergers are exogenous to non-merging carriers on a specific route. Merging decisions are made at the carrier level, so they should not be affected by factors that determine prices at a specific route. After controlling for mergers, the policy impact increases slightly, suggesting that after Spirit's baggage fee policy, its rivals reduce their prices by about 5.1%. The main change, however, is that interaction with lead variables are all insignificant now.
In column (4), we use IVs to deal with the endogeneity of HHI. 13 The estimate for HHI changes significantly. A change from symmetric duopoly (HHI = 0.5) to a monopoly (HHI) in a market would raise the price by about 13.3%. Estimate of the policy impact only changes slightly and remains negative and significant. Based on the results from column (4), we also provide a visual presentation of the estimated effects. Figure 3 plots the estimated means as well as the 95% confidence intervals for the interaction variables of SptM kt with P olicy and Leads. We can see that the confidence intervals of leads span above and below the zero line. In contrast, the confidence interval of the policy is all below the zero line, indicating the significant negative effect of Spirit's carry-on luggage fee on competing carriers' average ticket prices.
Differential impacts on the price distribution
Previously we have explored the average impact of Spirit's baggage policy on its rival's prices. Next, we explore the impacts at different points of the price distribution. We use the same specification as that in the last column of Table 6 . 14 Column (1)- (3) in Table 7 present the results for 3 different 11 See Kim and Singal (1993) for more detailed discussions. 12 More details about the merger dummies are provided in the Appendix. 13 We use similar IVs as in the literature (e.g., Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) ) but also constructed an additional IV. See more details in the Appendix. These IVs also pass under-identification test, weak identification tests and over-identification test.
14 The results are mostly in line with the average results in the previous table. One exception is that Lead4 now becomes significant for the 20-percentile prices. We performed an F test and the result shows that four interaction terms with leads are jointly insignificant. We also run regressions with the Leads removed and the main results stay the same. In particular, policy impact is the largest for the median prices, followed by the 20-percentile prices and then 80-percentile prices.
percentiles. We can see that the baggage policy has the largest impact on the 50-percentile of its rivals' prices -rivals' median prices go down by about 6.6% after the baggage policy. The impact is the smallest (in magnitude) and barely significant (at 10% level) for the 80-percentile prices. This is consistent with the perception that Spirit is an ultra low cost carrier, which mainly competes with lower to medium ends of major carriers.
We then run a similar regression, but use prices at the percentiles (rather than their logarithms) as the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 8 . We can see that the price impacts follow the same pattern in dollar amounts as those in percentage, namely, the impacts are larger at the middle than at the extremes.
Heterogeneous responses to policy by Spirit's rivals
We have shown that carriers adjust different points on their price distributions differently. But do different carriers respond to Spirit's baggage fee policy differently? In this section, we focus on whether the price response varies across one specific carrier characteristic, namely, outsourcing. Often times a (major) carrier (say A) may sell tickets to travelers while the actual flights are operated by a regional carrier (say B). 15 We define a variable Outsourcing ij (for carrier i at route j) which takes value 1 if carrier i outsources its operations to a regional carrier on route j for over 25% of all its pre-treatment periods (before Spirit's baggage fee policy). 16 Price responses have very different implications for the major and/or regional carriers depending on outsourcing status. When a major carrier is both the ticketing and operating carrier, price reduction is absorbed by the major carrier itself. In contrast, when a major carrier outsources its operations to a regional carrier, the price reduction is absorbed mostly by the regional carrier. The reason is as follows. Common outsourcing contract between major and regional carriers stipulates a fixed amount of payment from the regional carrier to the major carrier, for a given route and time period. That is, the regional carrier receives all ticket revenue, minus the fixed payment and needs to cover its own operation cost. To investigate how carriers' price response (to Spirit's policy) varies depending on outsourcing status, we consider the following econometric model, 17
15 We are not considering code-sharing across major airlines. Rather, we focus on the case where a major airline outsources the flight operations to a regional carrier on a route. 16 It is possible that some major carriers outsource while others do not on the same route. If we expect outsourcing carriers to respond differently, it would also indirectly affect the non-outsourcing carriers on the same market. To avoid this contamination, we drop the observations from the non-outsourcing carriers on routes which at least some carriers outsource. 17 Note that the stand-alone terms of P olicyt and Outsourcingij are absorbed by the time and carrier-route fixed effects respectively.
Our variable of interest is the triple interaction term SptM kt × P olicy × Outsourcing. The results are presented in Table 9 . We can see that the average price impact remains negative but is marginally significant. Relative to non-outsourcing carrier-routes (which already experiences a price reduction in response to Spirit's policy), price goes down further by about 5.8% on outsourcing carrier-routes. The impact is particularly strong and significant for median prices -the price reduction goes up to 10.7% (significant at 1% level).
Discussions
Previously we have shown that Spirit's rivals reduce their prices after Spirit's baggage fee policy change, and their price reduction is larger at the middle than at the two extremes of the price distribution. Moreover, price reduction is larger when the major airline outsources its operations to regional carriers. This suggests an excessive burden on the regional carriers.
Let's first see why Spirit's rivals reduce prices after the policy change. Charging for carry-on baggage is a form of unbundling. It is intuitive that the base ticket price will go down but the inclusive ticket price (including carry-on baggage fee) will go up after the policy change. 18 To see whether this is the case, we compare Spirit's prices before and after policy change, using the following econometric model.
Our variable of interest is P olicy t , which captures the change of Spirit's average prices before and after the policy. We do not claim this as a causal effect because the policy is endogenous to Spirit's own prices. Moreover, we cannot control time fixed effects. The results are presented in Table 10 . In column (1), we use the the logarithm of Spirit's average ticket prices while in column (2) we use average prices. From column (2), we can see that the basic fare goes down by about $5. 19 Price unbundling gives consumers more flexibility when flying with Spirit since they can choose between lower basic fare without carry-on baggage or higher inclusive fare with carry-on baggage. The lower basic fare, together with the extra flexibility, forces Spirit's rivals' to lower their prices to stay competitive with Spirit. But why do prices go down the most at the middle of the price distribution than at the extremes? Spirit, as a Ultra-Low-Cost Carrier, does not directly compete with major airlines for travelers at the high end price distribution of the major airlines. As a result, Spirit's baggage fee policy change should have relatively little impact on the high end price of its rivals. On the other hand, for the low end on the price distribution, the margin may be so low already before the policy 18 Brueckner et al. (2015) provides evidence that price unbundling decreases the carrier's own ticket price but increases the full price for passengers bringing a checked luggage.
19 Adding the carry-on baggage fee ($20) , however, the all-inclusive ticket price will go up, consistent with our intuition and with empirical findings in Brueckner et al. (2015) change that there is little additional room for prices to go down. In contrast, in the middle of the distribution, major airlines compete with Spirit airlines more directly and there is also more room for prices to go down after the policy change.
Next, we explain why the price reduction is more for outsourcing carrier-routes. When Spirit reduces its basic fare after the baggage fee policy, major airlines have different incentives to respond depending on their outsourcing status on the routes where they compete with Spirit. Outsourcing major carriers usually receive a fixed amount of payment from regional carriers they outsource operation to. As a result, the ticket revenue is claimed by the regional carriers even though the ticket prices are determined by the major carriers. When facing lower price Spirit, major airlines have an incentive to reduce the price further (the consequences are borne by the regional carriers) to stay competitive with Spirit. In contrast, non-outsourcing major carriers directly bear the burden of the price reduction, and thus have less incentive to decrease their prices. Additionally, it is commonly believed that regional carriers have cost advantage and as a result, there may be more room for prices to go down whey they operate the flights, relative to flights operated by major carriers directly.
Robustness checks
In this section, we perform several robustness checks. We start with falsification tests to better illustrate that our econometric specification properly controls for factors other than Spirit's baggage fee policy. That is, we construct settings where similar factors exist but there is not true policy change, and show that the fake policy change has no significant impacts. Also, we perform several sensitivity checks. As a first step, we review the trends in the airlines pricing in the two groups, the treated and the untreated, before the baggage fee policy change. In this practice, we could not reject the null hypothesis of a common trend in pricing between the two groups before the treatment. Second, we check various covariates of the two groups to examine if they are similar overall and simple graphic presentations show that the observables are not different from one another. The third sensitivity check is using other outcome variables. We present our five robustness/sensitivity check results below in turn.
Fake treatment group
Next, we randomly pick markets among Non-spirit markets and assign them as if they were treated markets. We first drop the observations of Spirit markets. For Non-Spirit markets, we randomly assign some markets to be treated. That is, we assign SptM kt jt = 1 randomly to some non-Spirit markets. P olicy t is coded the same way as before. The results are presented in Table  11 . We can see the interaction term is insignificant in all models. We also run a triple difference regression with similar results. See Table 12 .
Fake treatment time
We assume that Spirit adopted its baggage fee policy at a different time period. To avoid the impact of the actual policy, we only include data from pre-treatment periods, i.e., before the actual policy was adopted. The pre-treatment data has 6 periods, and we select the middle to be when the fake policy starts. That is, there are 3 periods each before and after the fake policy. We define a new variable F P which takes value 0 for the first 3 periods and 1 otherwise. Then we run regressions with the same specification of Table 8 except P olicy t is replaced by the fake policy dummy variable F P t . The results are presented in Table 13 . We are interested in the interaction term Sptmkt jt × F P t . The estimates are all statistically insignificant and we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are equal to zero, indicating that the fake policy has no impacts on competing carriers' ticket prices.
Using the same fake policy variable F P t , we also perform a falsification test for our triple difference regression to see whether carrier responses differ depending on their outsourcing status. The results are presented in Table 14 . In all specifications, we can see that coefficients for the triple interaction term are all insignificant, consistent with the fact that F P t only represents a fake policy.
Possibility of confounding factors
One potential concern is that coefficients for the double or triple interaction terms in our regressions do not capture the policy impact, but rather the impacts of confounding factors which affect both the Spirit policy and the dependent variables. For example, our estimated policy impacts may be caused by potential dynamic differences between Spirit and Non-Spirit markets or there may be unobserved demand shocks that vary across carrier-market-time. If this is the case, we would expect such factors to affect not just prices, but potentially other variables as well. We consider the following variables: number of passengers (in their logarithms) and market share. We expect these variables to be affected by some confounding factors, but not directly by the baggage fee policy. Results for these two dependent variables are presented in Table 15 and 16 respectively. We can see that both the double and triple interaction terms are insignificant. This helps to alleviate the concern of confounding factors and provides one more evidence that the policy impacts on prices found earlier, are due to the baggage fee policy.
Possibility of indirect policy impacts
Our estimation imposes the assumption that Spirit policy has only impact on markets that Spirit operates on (SptM kt jt = 1). One possibility is that after Spirit adopted the baggage fee policy, its decision on whether to operate in a market (entry/exit) also changed. In this case, policy has a direct impact on rivals' prices, as well as an indirect impact through changing Spirit's entry/exit strategy and in turn the composition of treated vs. control groups. Consequently the policy impacts we identified would be a mixture of the direct policy impact plus the indirect impact through changes in Spirit's entry/exit behavior. In order to test whether this is the case, we aggregate our sample to market-quarter level, and run the following logit regression.
Sptmkt jt = β 0 + β 1 × HHI jt + β 2 × mktf are jt + β 3 × ttpassengers jt + β 4 × ttenplanement jt + β 5 × HHI jt × P olicy t + β 6 × mktf are jt × P olicy t + β 7 × ttpassengers jt × P olicy t + β 8 × ttenplanement jt × P olicy t + δX ijt + θ t + u ijt
The dependent variable SptM kt jt , as defined earlier, is a dummy indicating whether Spirit operates in market j in quarter t. The regression tells us what factors can be used to predict Spirit's presence in a market. mktf are jt is the average ticket prices of the market. ttpassengers jt is the total passenger numbers, and ttenplanement jt the total enplanement. The interaction terms of these variables with P olicy t will capture whether there is any difference of Spirit' market entry & exit behavior before and after its policy. The estimation results are presented in Table 17 , from which we can see none coefficients of the interaction terms is significant. This suggests that Spirit did not change its market entry & exit behavior and thus Spirit's policy effects on competing carriers are not due to this possibility.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the impacts of Spirit's carry-on baggage fee policy on its rivals' prices. Our results suggest that, after Spirit charges for carry-on baggage, its rivals reduce their prices significantly. Moreover price reduction is the largest (in both percentage and absolute terms) at the median than at the extremes (80 and 20 percentiles). Linking price response to the rival airlines' outsourcing status, we find that the price reduction is significantly larger on markets where Spirit's rivals outsource their operations to regional airlines. Due to the nature of the outsourcing contracts, our results suggest that the major airlines shift much of the burden of price reduction to regional airlines they contract with.
Moving forward, there are several things we want to pursue. First, we would like to explore more robustness checks, as well as additional analysis that help illustrate the mechanism and intuitions behind the patterns of price responses observed in the data. Second, we want to develop a theory model to further investigate outsourcing with the goals to better understand the results we find as well as explore how outsourcing affect market competition in general. 
Appendices A Data Filter
We discuss how we construct our sample in this appendix. The main data set we use is the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) data, a 10% quarterly sample of airline tickets sold to passengers. It contains three different data sets: Coupon data, Market data, and Ticket data, and we use variables from all three data sets. Ticket data is at the itinerary level 20 , and we use the variables roundtrip and dollarcred from the data set. The former variable indicates whether the itinerary is a round trip or one-way trip, and the latter tells whether the ticket price is reliable.
20 If a passenger travels from A to B with a connecting point at C, and then travels back from B to A with a connecting point at D, the whole trip from A to C, C to B, B to D, and D to A is an itinerary. An itinerary can be one-way or round trip, and can include non-stop flights and/or connecting flights.
We drop the tickets which have unreliable prices. Market data is at the directional market level 21 and is the main data set we use. Variables we use from Market data include year, quarter, origin airport, destination airport, ticketing carrier, operating carrier, passenger numbers, market fare in dollars, market distance in miles, and market geography type. The last variable allows us to identify and use only the tickets of flights within the lower 48 states in the US. Ticket data is at the segment level 22 . The variable we use from Ticket data is fare class, which identifies passengers' service class level such as first class, business class and economy class.
We only use tickets of non-stop flights according to our market definition: directional non-stop route. It includes one-way non-stop flights and roundtrip flights with both way non-stop. For major ticketing carriers, we only use tickets of economy class. We do so because Spirit Airlines is an Ultra-Low-Cost Carrier, and mainly competes with major carriers for their economy class passengers. Following the literature, we drop all tickets with prices less than $10, which are generally considered as frequent-flyer tickets. We also drop the tickets with highest 2% prices for a ticketing carrier on a route in a quarter, because those high prices may be caused by coding error. We generate a variable called Outsourcing 23 , which indicates whether a ticketing carrier on a route in a quarter has outsourcing behavior. Outsourcing behavior happens when a major ticketing carrier outsources the flight service to another regional operating carrier. But if a special case happens, a major ticketing carrier letting its own subsidiaries provide the flight service, we do not consider it as outsourcing, because essentially the ticketing and the operating carriers are the same carrier. In the end we aggregate the data to carrier-route-quarter level, and calculate average, 20 percentile, 50 percentile, and 80 percentile ticket prices, and passenger numbers. From passenger numbers, we calculate market share for each carrier on a route in a quarter, and then HHI as well.
After aggregating the data, we drop the observation (carrier-route-quarter cell) if its passenger number is smaller than 5, because we believe such a carrier on the route is too small to affect or be affected by other carriers, and they may have different behaviors. As we are more interested in the response of large ticketing carriers, we drop all small or regional ticketing carriers. In our treatment group there must be at least one carrier competing with Spirit so that we can tell the competing carriers' response to Spirit's policy change, so in our control group it is not appropriate to have some routes where a monopolist serves without any competition. As a result, we eliminate all the routes whose HHI is equal to 1 in the quarter. Alaska Airline and Virgin American began to charge $15 first checked luggage fee on July 7th and May 5th separately, which are in the middle of our sample periods. So we eliminate all the routes in which Alaska and Virgin American operate to avoid further complication to our identification. We then merge Metropolitan and Micropolitan 21 A market in DB1B data is defined as the travel from one origin airport to another destination airport. For example, in the case mentioned in last footnote, the trip from A to B is a market, and the trip from B to A is another market, no matter whether the trip involves two or more connecting flights or a non-stop flight.
22 Segments are routes, which compose a market. A segment can be a part of a market or a market itself. For example, in the case mentioned above, the trips from A to C, C to B, B to D, and D to A are four segments. 23 This is different from the variable we use in our regressions.
statistical areas population estimation data into our main data set by airport areas. Some airports need to be matched manually to the corresponding metropolitan or micropolitan statistical areas. The two data sets are not matched perfectly, and a few small airports which cannot be matched have to be dropped from the sample.
Last, we discuss how enplanement is approximated in this paper. Instead of obtaining enplanement information from T-100 segment data, we approximate it from DB1B Coupon data. By aggregating passenger numbers of each segment in each quarter, we can get how many passengers each ticketing carrier delivers from one airport directly to another airport. This number is no smaller than the passenger number in each market we derived above, because these two airports are not necessarily passengers' origin airport or destination airport in Coupon data, and the segment can be one of the passengers' connecting flights. This is exactly what we need as enplanement, the only difference is that the enplanement from Coupon data is a 10% survey instead of the actual enplanement.
B Construction of Leads
Starting from the period policy was first adopted and going backwards, it is possible that Spirit or any other airline may not operate in the previous period. Consequently, we run into two kinds of missing observation problems. In the first kind, say we have an observation ijt in the treated group. If we move back one period, observation ij(t − 1) may be in the control group. That is, Spirit operates in market j in period t but not in period t − 1. In the second kind, ij(t − 1) may be missing, because carrier i (which is not Spirit) operates in market j in period t but not in period t − 1. Our solution to both missing observations problems is that, going back 1 period from t to t − 1, if we cannot find observation ij(t − 1) in the same group, then we will going back further in time. Essentially we convert 1-period lead to 1-observation lead.
We first divide our whole sample into two groups. The treated group includes all observations such that SptM kt jt = 1 while the control group includes the rest (SptM kt jt = 0). We then define 1-period Lead variable for each group, starting with the treated group. Find the first period that P olicy t = 1. From that period, move backwards. For any ij (carrier-route) combination, identify the first time that both Spirit and carrier i operate on route j. Let t T ij1 denote that time period. 24 Then Lead T ij1 = 0 for all periods before t T ij1 and Lead T ij1 = 0 for period t T ij1 and later. Let's consider a hypothetical example for more details. Suppose that P olicy t = 1 first occurs at period n. Moving backwards by 1 period, it is period n − 1. Suppose that Spirit does not operate in market j at period n − 1. Then we need to move back 1 more period again, to period n − 2. Suppose that carrier i does not operate in market j in period n − 2. Then we need to move back one more period, to period n − 3. Suppose that both Spirit and carrier i operate in market j in period n − 3. Then period n − 3 is the first time that both Spirit and carrier i operate in market j, moving backwards from period n. That is, t T ij1 = n − 3. Then Lead T ijk takes value of 0 for period until n − 4 and takes value 1 for period n − 3 and later.
1-period lead variables for the control group are constructed similarly. Find the first period that P olicy t = 1. From that period, move backwards, for any ij (carrier-route) combination, identify the first time that carrier i operate on route j. 25 Let t C ij1 denote that time period. Then Lead C ij1 = 0 for all periods before t C ij1 and Lead C ij1 = 1 for period t C ij1 and later. We then define k-period (k = 2, 3, 4) Lead variables. For example, consider the treated group. Find the first period that P olicy t = 1. From that period, move backwards, for any ij (carrier-route) combination, identify the k th time that both Spirit and carrier i operate on route j. Let t T ijk denote that time period. Then Lead T ijk = 0 for all periods before t T ijk and Lead T ijk = 1 for period t T ijk and later. Lead C ijk can be defined similarly, k = 2, 3, 4. Note that each ijt observation can only be in one group: the treated or the control group. We then define Lead ijk as follows. If the observation ijt is in the treated group, then Lead ijk takes the value of Lead T ijk , evaluated at period t. If the observation ijt is in the control group, then Lead ijk takes the value of Lead C ijk , also evaluated at period t.
C Merger Dummies
The following merger dummies are defined at the route level, and thus route specific. They are also defined in the generalized way.
merged is equal to 1 if two carriers finish merging in the quarter on the route, and equal to 0 otherwise. merged lead n is equal to 1 in the nth quarter before two carriers finish merging on the route, and equal to 0 otherwise. merged lag n is equal to 1 in the nth quarter after two carriers finish merging on the route, and equal to 0 otherwise. For the variables above, we divide them into 4 groups:
• The route on which both merging carriers operate before but one operates after the merger.
• The route on which both merging carriers operate before but none operates after the merger.
• The route on which only one merging carrier operates before and one operates after the merger.
• The route on which only one merging carrier operates before but none operates after the merger.
mgrann is equal to 1 in the quarter when two carriers announce their merger decisions on the route where at least one of them operate.
merger is equal to 1 in the quarter when the merger is approved and two carriers begin to merge and on the route where at least one of them operate. mgrann leads, mgrann lags, and merger lags are defined in the same way as merged l eads and merged l ags.
For the variables above, we also divide them into 2 groups:
• the route where both merging carriers operate.
• the route where only one merging carrier operates.
The following merger dummies are defined at the carrier level: DL merged, F L ann, W N ann, F L merge, W N merge, U A ann, CO ann, U A merge, CO merge. The first two letters indicate carriers. The letters after the underscode indicate the state of the merger. merged means the merger has been finished, ann means the merger has been announcement, and merge means the merger is under process. For example, DL merged is equal to 1 if the carrier is Delta Airline and the merger of Delta and Northwest has been finished. After we drop observations of merging carriers in their merging process, there is no need to control these carrier level merger dummies.
D Instrument Variables for HHI
We have 7 IVs in total. Six of them are used and described in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009): lndis j : The logarithm of nonstop distance in miles between endpoint airports.
ameanpop jt : The arithmetic mean of the metropolitan and micropolitan population 26 of endpoint cities in each year.
gmeanpop jt : The geometric mean of the metropolitan and micropolitan population of endpoint cities in each year.
lnpassrte jt : The logarithm of total enplanement 27 on route j in period t. 26 Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) uses 2000 census data. We use yearly population estimation. 27 Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) drop the observations that ticketing carrier is not the same as operating carrier. We use DB1B data to approximate enplanement and do not drop operating carriers and. So the enplanement in a market in our paper is a little different from theirs.
GEN SP :
EN P j1 * EN P j2 / √ EN P k1 * EN P k2 , where k indexes all carriers, j is the observed carrier, and EN P k1 and EN P k2 are carrier k's average quarterly enplanements at the two endpoint airports.
IRU T HERF :M KT SHARE
is the fitted value for M KT SHARE ijt from its first-stage regression.
Besides theirs, another IV we use is Oenplanement: ( T EN P kj1 − T EN P ij1 ) * ( T EN P kj2 − T EN P ij2 ), where k indexes all carriers, i is the observed carrier, and j indexes route. T EN P kj1 and T EN P kj2 are carrier k's total quarterly enplanements at the two endpoint airports. Notes: Time fixed effect and Market-Carrier fixed effect are controlled. The T tests of the interaction terms of leads are Granger-causality tests, and served to check whether the common trend assumption holds. Prices of Spirit and Non-Spirit Market 
